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Abstract
We propose a multi-agent variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem, in which there are N
agents and K arms, and pulling an arm generates a (possibly different) stochastic reward to each agent.
Unlike the classical multi-armed bandit problem, the goal is not to learn the “best arm”, as each agent
may perceive a different arm as best for her. Instead, we seek to learn a fair distribution over arms.
Drawing on a long line of research in economics and computer science, we use the Nash social welfare
as our notion of fairness. We design multi-agent variants of three classic multi-armed bandit algorithms,
and show that they achieve sublinear regret, now measured in terms of the Nash social welfare.
1 Introduction
In the classic (stochastic) multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, a principal has access to K arms, and pulling
an arm j generates a stochastic reward from an unknown distribution with an unknown mean µ∗j . If these
mean rewards were known a priori, the principal could just pull a best arm, argmaxj µ
∗
j , every time. However,
the principal has no prior information about the quality of the arms. Hence, she uses a learning algorithm
which pulls an arm jt in round t, observes the stochastic reward generated, and uses that information to
learn the best arm over time. The performance of such an algorithm is measured in terms of its cumulative
regret up to a horizon T , which is the total difference between the best mean reward and the mean reward
of the arms pulled by round T , i.e.,
∑T
t=1(maxj µ
∗
j − µ∗jt).
This problem can model a situation where the principal is deliberating a policy decision, and the arms
are the different alternatives she can implement. However, in many real-life scenarios, making a policy
decision affects not one, but several agents. For example, imagine a company making a decision that affects
all its employees, or a conference deciding the structure of its review process, which affects various research
communities. This can be modeled by a multi-agent variant of the multi-armed bandit (MA-MAB) problem,
in which there are N agents, and pulling an arm j generates a stochastic reward to each agent i from an
unknown distribution with an unknown mean µ∗i,j .
Before pondering about learning the “best arm”, we must ask what the best arm even means in this
context. Indeed, the “best arm” for one agent may not be the best for another. A first attempt may be to
associate some “aggregate quality” to each arm; for example, the quality of arm j may be defined as the
total mean reward it gives to all agents, i.e.,
∑
i µ
∗
i,j . This would nicely reduce our problem to the classic
multi-armed bandit problem, for which we have an armory of available solutions [1]. However, this approach
∗During the course of this work, Shah was partially funded by an NSERC Discovery Grant.
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suffers from the tyranny of the majority [2]. For example, imagine a scenario with ten agents and two arms,
where four agents derive a fixed reward of 1 from the first arm but zero from the second, while the remaining
six derive a fixed reward of 1 from the second arm but zero from the first. The aforementioned approach
will deem the second arm as the best, and a classic MAB algorithm will converge to repeatedly pulling
this arm, thus unfairly treating the first four agents (a minority). A solution which treats each group in a
“proportionally fair” manner should ideally converge to pulling the first arm 40% of the time and the second
60% of the time. Alternatively, we can allow probability distributions over arms, and seek an algorithm that
converges to putting probability 0.4 on the first arm and 0.6 on the second.
This problem of making a fair collective decision when the available alternatives — in this case, distribu-
tions over arms — affect multiple agents is well-studied in computational social choice [3], and the literature
offers a compelling fairness notion called the Nash social welfare, named after John Nash. According to this
criterion, the fairest distribution maximizes the product of the expected utilities to the agents. A distribution
p that puts probability pj on arm j gives expected utility
∑
j pj · µ∗i,j to agent i. Hence, the goal is to max-
imize NSW(p, µ∗) =
∏N
i=1(
∑K
j=1 pj · µ∗i,j) over p. One can verify that this approach on the aforementioned
example indeed yields probability 0.4 on the first arm and 0.6 on the second, as desired. It is also interesting
to point out that with a single agent (N = 1), the distribution maximizing the Nash social welfare puts
probability 1 on the best arm, thus effectively reducing the problem to the classical multi-armed bandit
problem.
Maximizing the Nash social welfare is often seen as a middle ground between maximizing the sum of
utilities to the agents, which is unfair to minorities (as we observed), and maximizing the minimum utility
to any agent, which is considered too extreme [2]. The solution that maximizes the Nash social welfare has
also been shown to satisfy many other fairness desiderata [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]; for further discussion on
this, see Section 6.
When exactly maximizing the Nash social welfare is not possible (either due to a lack of complete
information or due to computational difficulty), researchers have sought to achieve approximate fairness by
approximately maximizing this objective [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Following this approach in our problem,
we define the (cumulative) regret of an algorithm at horizon T as
∑T
t=1(maxpNSW(p, µ
∗) − NSW(pt, µ∗)),
where pt is the distribution selected in round t. Our goal in this paper is to design algorithms whose regret
is sublinear in T .
1.1 Our Results
We consider three classic algorithms for the multi-armed bandit problem: Explore-First, Epsilon-Greedy, and
UCB [1]. All three algorithms attempt to balance exploration (pulling arms only to learn their rewards) and
exploitation (using the information learned so far to pull “good” arms). Explore-First performs exploration
followed by exploitation to achieve regret O˜ (K1/3T 2/3). Epsilon-Greedy flips a coin in each round to decide
whether to perform exploration or exploitation, and achieves the same regret bound. Its key advantage
over Explore-First is that it does not need to know the horizon T upfront. UCB merges exploration and
exploitation to achieve better regret O˜ (K1/2T 1/2) bound. Here, O˜ hides log factors, and we note that the
focus is more on the exponent of T than on the exponent of K, as the horizon T is often large while the
number of arms K is constant.
We propose natural multi-agent variants of the three algorithms, which take the Nash social welfare
objective into account and select a distribution over arms in each round rather than a single arm. For
Explore-First, we derive O˜ (N2/3K1/3T 2/3) regret bound, which recovers the aforementioned single-agent
bound with an additional factor of N2/3. We also show that changing a parameter of the algorithm yields a
different regret bound, which reduces N2/3 to N1/3 at the expense of increasing K1/3 to K2/3, thus offering
a tradeoff to the principal. We derive the same bounds for Epsilon-Greedy, although through a much more
intricate analysis. Finally, for UCB we derive O˜ (NKT 1/2) and O˜ (N1/2K3/2T 1/2) regret bounds; while we
recover the
√
T factor as in the single-agent case, the dependence on K worsens in our bounds. That said,
we cannot hope to improve the dependence on T further because the
√
T factor is known to be optimal even
in the single-agent case [1].
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Deriving these regret bounds for the multi-agent case requires overcoming two key difficulties that do not
appear in the single-agent case. First, our goal is to optimize a complex function, the Nash social welfare,
rather than simply selecting the best arm. This requires a Lipschitz-continuity analysis of the Nash social
welfare function and the use of new tools such as the McDiarmid’s inequality which are not needed in the
standard analysis. Second, the optimization is over an infinite space (the set of distributions over arms)
rather than over a finite space (the set of arms). Thus, certain tricks such as a simple union bound no longer
work; we use the concept of δ-covering, used heavily in the Lipschitz bandit framework [18], in order to
address this.
1.2 Related Work
Since the multi-armed bandit problem was introduced by Thompson [19], many variants of it have been
proposed, such as sleeping bandit [20], contextual bandit [21], dueling bandit [22], Lipschitz bandit [18],
etc. However, all these variants involve a single agent who is affected by the decisions. We note that other
multi-agent variants of the multi-armed bandit problem have been explored recently [23, 24]; however, their
focus is on getting the agents to cooperate to solve the classic multi-armed bandit problem to maximize the
reward to a single principal.
Another key aspect of our framework is the focus on fairness. Recently, several papers have focused on
fairness in the multi-armed bandit problem. For instance, Joseph et al. [25] design a UCB variant which
guarantees what they refer to as meritocratic fairness to the arms, i.e., that a worse arm is never preferred
to a better arm regardless of the algorithm’s confidence intervals for them. Liu et al. [26] require that similar
arms be treated similarly, i.e., two arms with similar mean rewards be selected with similar probabilities.
Gillen et al. [27] focus on satisfying fairness with respect to an unknown fairness metric. And Patil et al. [28]
assume that there are external constraints requiring that each arm be pulled in at least a certain fraction
of the rounds, and design algorithms that achieve low regret subject to this constraint. However, all these
papers seek to achieve fairness with respect to the arms. In contrast, in our work, the arms are inanimate
(e.g. policy decisions), and we seek fairness with respect to the agents, who are separate from the arms.
From a computational social choice theoretic perspective, maximizing the Nash social welfare when the
rewards are known upfront is well-studied [7, 29, 30]. Our work can be viewed as performing Nash social
welfare maximization when noisy information can be queried regarding the rewards.
2 Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, define [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Let N,K ∈ N. In the multi-agent multi-armed bandit (MA-MAB)
problem, there is a set of agents [N ] and a set of arms [K]. For each agent i ∈ [N ] and arm j ∈ [K], there
is a reward distribution Di,j with mean µ
∗
i,j and support [0, 1];
1 when arm j is pulled, each agent i observes
an independent reward sampled from Di,j . Let us refer to µ
∗ = (µ∗i,j)i∈[N ],j∈[K] ∈ [0, 1]N×K as the (true)
reward matrix.
Policies: As mentioned in the introduction, pulling an arm deterministically may be favorable to one agent,
but disastrous to another. Hence, we are interested in probability distributions over arms, which we refer
to as policies. The K-simplex, denoted ∆K , is the set of all policies. For a policy p ∈ ∆K , pj denotes the
probability with which arm j is pulled. Note that due to linearity of expectation, the expected reward to
agent i under policy p is
∑K
j=1 pj · µ∗i,j .
Nash social welfare: The Nash social welfare is defined the product of (expected) rewards to the agents.
Given µ = (µi,j)i∈[N ],j∈[K], and policy p ∈ ∆K , define NSW(p, µ) =
∏N
i=1
(∑K
j=1 pj · µi,j
)
. Thus, the (true)
Nash social welfare under policy p is NSW(p, µ∗). Hence, if we knew µ∗, we would pick an optimal policy
p∗ ∈ argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ∗). However, because we do not know µ∗ in advance, our algorithms will often
1We need the support of the distribution to be non-negative and bounded, but the upper bound of 1 is without loss of
generality. All our bounds scale linearly with the upper bound on the support.
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produce an estimate µ̂, and use it to choose a policy; the quantity NSW(p, µ̂) will play a key role in our
algorithms and their analysis.
Algorithms: An algorithm for the MA-MAB problem chooses a policy pt in each round t ∈ N. Then, an
arm at is sampled according to policy pt, and for each agent i ∈ [N ], a reward Xti,at is sampled independently
from distribution Di,at . At the end of round t, the algorithm learns the sampled arm a
t and the reward
vector (Xti,at)i∈[N ], which it can use to choose policies in the later rounds.
Reward estimates: All our algorithms maintain an estimate of the mean reward matrix µ∗ at every round.
For round t and arm j ∈ [K], let ntj =
∑t−1
s=1 1[a
s = j] denote the number of times arm j is pulled at the
beginning of round t, and let µ̂ti,j =
1
nt
j
∑
s∈[t−1]:as=j X
s
i,j denote the average reward experienced by agent
i from the ntj pulls of arm j thus far. Our algorithms treat these as an estimate of µ
∗
i,j available at the
beginning of round t. Let µ̂t = (µ̂ti,j)i∈[N ],j∈[K].
Regret: Recall that p∗ is an optimal policy that has the highest Nash social welfare. The instantaneous
regret in round t due to an algorithm choosing pt is rt = NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(pt, µ∗). The (cumulative) regret
in round T due to an algorithm choosing p1, . . . , pT is RT =
∑T
t=1 r
t. We note that RT and rt are defined
for a specific algorithm, which will be clear from the context. We are interested in bounding the expected
regret E[RT ] of an algorithm at round T , where the expectation is over the randomness involved in sampling
the arms at and the agent rewards (Xti,at)i∈[N ] for t ∈ [T ].2 We say that an algorithm is horizon-dependent
if it needs to know T in advance in order to yield bounded regret at round T , and horizon-independent if it
yields such a bound without knowing T in advance.
δ-Covering: Given a metric space (X, d) and δ > 0, a set S ⊆ X is called a δ-cover if for each x ∈ X , there
exists s ∈ S with d(x, s) ≤ δ. That is, from each point in the metric space, there is a point in the δ-cover
that is no more than δ distance away. We will heavily use the fact that there exists a δ-cover of (∆K , ‖·‖1)
(i.e. the K-simplex under the L1 distance) with size at most (1 + 2/δ)
K
[31, p. 126], which follows from a
simple discretization of the simplex.
3 Explore-First
Algorithm 1: Explore-First
Input: Number of agents N , number of arms K, horizon T
Parameters :Exploration period L
// Pull each arm L times
for t = 1, . . . ,K · L do // Exploration
j ← ⌈t/L⌉
pt ← policy that puts probability 1 on arm j // Pull arm j deterministically
end
Compute the estimated reward matrix µ̂ , µ̂K·L+1 of the rewards observed so far
Compute p̂ ∈ argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂)
for t = K · L+ 1, . . . , T do // Exploitation
pt ← p̂
end
Perhaps the simplest algorithm (with a sublinear regret bound) in the classic single-agent MAB framework
is Explore-First. It is composed of two distinct stages. The first stage is exploration, during which the
2The algorithms we study do not introduce any further randomness in choosing the policies.
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algorithm pulls each arm L times. At the end of this stage, the algorithm computes the arm â with the
best estimated mean reward, and in the subsequent exploitation stage, pulls arm â in every round. The
algorithm is horizon-dependent, i.e., it takes the horizon T as input and sets L as a function of T . Setting
L = Θ
(
K−
2
3 T
2
3 log
1
3 (T )
)
yields regret bound E[RT ] = O
(
K
1
3T
2
3 log
1
3 (T )
)
[1].
In our multi-agent variant, presented as Algorithm 1, the exploration stage pulls each arm L times as
before. However, at the end of this stage, the algorithm computes, not an arm â, but a policy p̂ with the
best estimated Nash social welfare. During exploitation, it then uses policy p̂ in every round. With an
almost identical analysis as in the single-agent setting, we recover the aforementioned regret bound with an
additional N2/3 factor for N agents.
Using a novel and more intricate argument, we show that a different tradeoff between the exponents
of N and K can be obtained, where N2/3 is reduced to N1/3 at the expense of increasing K1/3 to K2/3
(and adding a logarithmic term). The same approach, but with more tricks, is presented in later sections to
analyze more sophisticated algorithms. Thus, for the reader’s convenience, we defer the proof of the next
result to the appendix.
Theorem 1. Explore-First is horizon-dependent, and has the following expected regret at round T .
• When L = Θ
(
N
2
3 K−
2
3T
2
3 log
1
3 (NKT )
)
, E[RT ] = O
(
N
2
3K
1
3T
2
3 log
1
3 (NKT )
)
.
• When L = Θ
(
N
1
3 K−
1
3T
2
3 log
2
3 (NKT )
)
, E[RT ] = O
(
N
1
3K
2
3T
2
3 log
2
3 (NKT )
)
.
4 Epsilon-Greedy
Algorithm 2: ǫt-Greedy
Input: Number of agents N , number of arms K
Parameters :Exploration probabilities ǫt for t ∈ N
curr ← 1 // Next arm to pull during exploration
for t = 1, 2, . . . , do
Toss a coin with success probability ǫt
if success then // Exploration
// Round-robin among arms during exploration
pt ← policy that puts probability 1 on arm curr // Pull it deterministically
curr ← curr + 1 // When curr becomes K + 1, reset to 1
else // Exploitation
Compute the estimated reward matrix µ̂t from the rewards observed so far
pt ← argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂t)
end
end
A slightly more sophisticated algorithm than Explore-First is Epsilon-Greedy, which is presented as
Algorithm 2. It spreads out exploration instead of performing it all at the beginning. Specifically, at
each round t, it performs exploration with probability ǫt, and exploitation otherwise. Exploration cycles
through the arms in a round-robin fashion, while exploitation uses the policy pt with the highest Nash
social welfare under the current estimated reward matrix (rather than choosing a single estimated best
arm as in the classical algorithm). The key advantage of Epsilon-Greedy over Explore-First is that it is
horizon-independent.
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However, in the µ̂ computed in Explore-First at the end of exploration, each µ̂i,j is the average of L iid
samples, where L is fixed. In contrast, in the µ̂t computed in Epsilon-Greedy in round t, each µ̂ti,j is the
average of ntj iid samples. The fact that n
t
j is itself a random variable and the µ̂
t
i,j-s are correlated through
the ntj-s prevents a direct application of certain statistical inequalities, thus complicating the analysis of
Epsilon-Greedy. To address this, we first present a sequence of useful lemmas that apply to any algorithm,
and then use them to prove the regret bounds of Epsilon-Greedy and later UCB.
4.1 Useful Lemmas
We begin by focusing on the Nash social welfare function NSW(p, µ). We are interested in how much the
function can change when its argument change. To that end, the following lemma translates the difference
in a product to a sum of point-wise differences that are easier to deal with.
Lemma 1. Let ai, bi ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ [N ]. Then,
∣∣∣∏Ni=1 ai −∏Ni=1 bi∣∣∣ ≤∑Ni=1 |ai − bi|.
Proof. We prove this using induction on N . For N = 1, the lemma trivially holds. Suppose it holds for
N = n. For N = n+ 1, we have∣∣∣∣∣
n+1∏
i=1
ai −
n+1∏
i=1
bi
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
n+1∏
i=1
ai − bn+1
n∏
i=1
ai + bn+1
n∏
i=1
ai −
n+1∏
i=1
bi
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
(
n∏
i=1
ai
)
|an+1 − bn+1|+ bn+1 ·
∣∣∣∣∣
n∏
i=1
ai −
n∏
i=1
bi
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |an+1 − bn+1|+
n∑
i=1
|ai − bi| =
n+1∑
i=1
|ai − bi| ,
where the second transition is due to the triangle inequality, and the third transition holds due to the
induction hypothesis and because ai, bi ∈ [0, 1] for each i.
Using Lemma 1, we can easily analyze Lipschitz-continuity of NSW(p, µ) when either p or µ changes and
the other is fixed. First, we consider change in p with µ fixed.
Lemma 2. Given a reward matrix µ ∈ [0, 1]N×K and policies p1, p2 ∈ ∆K , we have∣∣NSW(p1, µ)−NSW(p2, µ)∣∣ ≤ N · ∥∥p1 − p2∥∥
1
= N ·
∑
j∈[K]
∣∣p1j − p2j ∣∣ .
Proof. Using Lemma 1, we have
∣∣NSW(p1, µ)−NSW(p2, µ)∣∣ ≤ ∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[K]
(p1j − p2j) · µi,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ N ·
∑
j∈[K]
∣∣p1j − p2j ∣∣ ,
where the final transition is due to the triangle inequality and because µi,j ∈ [0, 1] for each i, j.
Next, we consider change in µ with p fixed.
Lemma 3. Given a policy p ∈ ∆K , and reward matrices µ1, µ2 ∈ [0, 1]N×K, we have∣∣NSW(p, µ1)−NSW(p, µ2)∣∣ ≤ ∑
i∈[N ]
∑
j∈[K]
pj ·
∣∣µ1i,j − µ2i,j∣∣ .
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Proof. Again, using Lemma 1, we have
∣∣NSW(p, µ1)−NSW(p, µ2)∣∣ ≤ ∑
i∈[N ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈[K]
pj · (µ1i,j − µ2i,j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i∈[N ],j∈[K]
pj ·
∣∣µ1i,j − µ2i,j∣∣ ,
where the last transition is due to the triangle inequality.
Recall that µ∗ and µ̂t denote the true reward matrix and the estimated reward matrix at the beginning
of round t, respectively. Our goal is to find an upper bound on the quantity |NSW(p, µ∗)−NSW(p, µ̂t)|
that, with high probability, holds at every p ∈ ∆K simultaneously. To that end, we first need to show that
µ̂t will be close to µ∗ with high probability.
Recall that random variable ntj denotes the number of times arm j is pulled by an algorithm before
round t, and µ̂ti,j is an average over n
t
j independent samples. Hence, we cannot directly apply Hoeffding’s
inequality, but we can nonetheless use standard tricks from the literature.
Lemma 4. Define rtj =
√
log(NKt)
ntj
, and event
Et , ∀i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [K] :
∣∣µ̂ti,j − µ∗i,j∣∣ ≤ rtj .
Then, for any algorithm and any t, we have Pr[Et] ≥ 1− 2t .
Proof. Fix t. For i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [K], and ℓ ∈ [t], let vℓi,j denote the average reward to agent i from the first ℓ
pulls of arm j, and define rℓj =
√
log(NKt)
ℓ . Then, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
∀i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [K], ℓ ∈ [t] : Pr [∣∣vℓi,j − µi,j∣∣ > rℓj] ≤ 2(NKt)2 .
By the union bound, we get
Pr
[∀i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [K], ℓ ∈ [t] : ∣∣vℓi,j − µi,j ∣∣ ≤ rℓj] ≥ 1− 2NKt.
Because ntj ∈ [t] for each j ∈ [K], the above event implies our desired event Et. Hence, we have that
Pr[Et] ≥ 1− 2/(NKt) ≥ 1− 2/t.
Conditioned on Et, we wish to bound |NSW(p, µ∗)− NSW(p, µ̂t)| simultaneously at all p ∈ ∆K . We
provide two such (incomparable) bounds, which will form the crux of our regret bound analysis. The first
bound is a direct application of the Lipschitz-continuity analysis from Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. Conditioned on Et, we have that
∀p ∈ ∆K :
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≤ N · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj .
Proof. Conditioned on Et, we have
∣∣µ̂ti,j − µ∗i,j∣∣ ≤ rtj for each j ∈ [K]. In that case, it is easy to see that the
upper bound from Lemma 3 becomes N ·∑j∈[K] pj · rtj .
The factor of N in Lemma 5 stems from analyzing how much µ̂t may deviate from µ∗ conditioned on Et,
in the worst case. However, even after conditioning on Et, µ̂t remains a random variable. Hence, one may
expect that its deviation, and thus the difference |NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)|, may be smaller in expectation.
Thus, to derive a different bound than in Lemma 5, we wish to apply McDiarmid’s inequality. However,
there are two issues in doing so directly.
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• McDiarmid’s inequality bounds the deviation of NSW(p, µ̂t) from its expected value. If µ̂t consisted
of independent random variables, like in Explore-First, this would be equal to NSW(p, µ∗). However,
in general, these variables may be correlated through ntj . We use a conditioning trick to address this
issue.
• We cannot hope to apply McDiarmid’s inequality at each p ∈ ∆K separately and use the union bound
because ∆K is infinite. So we apply it at each p in a δ-cover of ∆K , apply the union bound, and then
translate the guarantee to nearby p ∈ ∆K using the Lipschitz-continuity analysis from Lemma 2.
The next result is one of the key technical contributions of our work with a rather long proof.
Lemma 6. Define the event
Ht , ∀p ∈ ∆K :
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≤√4NK log(NKt) · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj +
4
t
.
Then, for any algorithm and any t, we have Pr[Ht|Et] ≥ 1− 2/t.
Proof. Fix p ∈ ∆K . Fix δ > 0, and let P be a δ-cover of the policy simplex ∆K with |P| ≤ (1 + 2/δ)K [31,
p. 126].
Conditioned on Et (i.e.
∣∣µ̂ti,j − µ∗i,j∣∣ ≤ rtj = √ log(NKt)ntj , ∀i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [K]), we wish to derive a high
probability bound on |NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)|. We can bound the deviation of NSW(p, µ̂t) from its
expected value. However, unlike in the case of Explore-First, we cannot directly claim that the expected
value is NSW(p, µ∗) because µ̂t consists of random variables that may be correlated through the random
varaible nt = (nt1, . . . , n
t
K) taking values in [t]
K . Thus, we further condition on the value taken by nt.
Specifically, fix ℓ = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓK) ∈ [t]K . For each j ∈ [K], define rℓjj =
√
log(NKt)
ℓj
. We use L to denote
the event that nt takes the value ℓ.
Evaluating conditional expectation: Conditioned on L, each µ̂ti,j is independent and satisfies E[µ̂ti,j ] =
µ∗i,j . Since expectation decomposes over sums and products of independent random variables, we have
E[NSW(p, µ̂t)|L] = NSW(p, µ∗).
We next argue that further conditioning on the high probability event Et does not change the expectation
by much. Formally, ∣∣NSW(p, µ∗)− E [NSW(p, µ̂t)|Et ∧ L]∣∣
=
∣∣E [NSW(p, µ̂t)|L] − E [NSW(p, µ̂t)|Et ∧ L]∣∣
= Pr[¬Et] · ∣∣E [NSW(p, µ̂t)|(¬Et) ∧ L] − E [NSW(p, µ̂t)|Et ∧ L]∣∣
≤ Pr[¬Et] ≤ 2
t
, (1)
where the penultimate transition holds because NSW is bounded in [0, 1], and the final transition is due to
Lemma 4.
Applying McDiarmid’s inequality: We first decompose µ̂t into N random variables: for each i ∈ [N ],
let µ̂ti = (µ̂
t
i,j)j∈[K]. To apply McDiarmid’s inequality, we need to analyze the maximum amount ci by which
changing µ̂ti can change NSW(p, µ̂
t). Fix i ∈ [N ], and fix all the variables except µ̂ti. Conditioned on Et ∧L,
each µ̂ti,j can change by at most 2r
ℓj
j . Hence, using Lemma 3, we have that ci ≤ 2
∑
j∈[K] pj · rℓjj . Now,
applying McDiarmid’s inequality, we have
Pr
[∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)− E [NSW(p, µ̂t)|Et ∧ L]∣∣ ≥ ǫ | Et ∧ L] ≤ 2e −2ǫ2∑i∈[N ] c2i = 2e
−2ǫ2
4N·
(∑
j∈[K]
pj ·r
ℓj
j
)2
.
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Using Equation (1), and setting ǫ =
√
2N log(|P|t) ·∑j∈[K] pj · rℓjj , we have that for each ℓ ∈ [t]K ,
Pr
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≥√2N log(|P|t) · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rℓjj +
2
t
∣∣∣ Et ∧ 1[nt = ℓ]
 ≤ 2|P|t .
Removing the conditioning on nt: We can now remove the conditioning on nt as follows.
Pr
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≥√2N log(|P|t) · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj +
2
t
∣∣∣∣Et

=
∑
ℓ∈[t]K
Pr[nt = ℓ]·
Pr
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≥√2N log(|P|t) · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rℓjj +
2
t
∣∣∣∣Et ∧ 1[nt = ℓ]

≤
∑
ℓ∈[t]K
Pr[nt = ℓ] · 2|P|t =
2
|P|t .
Extending to all policies in P: Using the union bound, we have that
Pr
∀p ∈ P : ∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≤√2N log(|P|t) · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj +
2
t
∣∣∣∣ Et
 ≥ 1− 2
t
.
Extending to all policies in ∆K: For p ∈ ∆K , let p ∈ argminp′∈P ‖p− p′‖1. Then, since P is a δ-cover,
we have ‖p− p‖1 ≤ δ. Thus, due to Lemma 2, we have∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≤ ∑
µ∈{µ̂t,µ∗}
|NSW(p, µ)−NSW(p, µ)|
+
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣
≤ 2Nδ +
∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ .
Setting δ = 1Nt , we have
Pr
∀p ∈ ∆K : ∣∣NSW(p, µ̂t)−NSW(p, µ∗)∣∣ ≤√2N log(|P|t) · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj +
4
t
∣∣∣∣ Et
 ≥ 1− 2
t
.
Substituting |P| ≤ (1 + 2/δ)K ≤ (3/δ)K with δ = 1Nt yields the desired bound.
Finally, we need the following lemma for technical purposes.
Lemma 7. For constant p ∈ R, ∑Tt=1 tp is Θ(logT ) if p = −1, and Θ (T p+1) otherwise.
4.2 Analysis of Epsilon-Greedy
We can now use these lemmas to derive the regret bounds for Epsilon-Greedy.
Theorem 2. Epsilon-Greedy is horizon-independent, and has the following expected regret at any round T .
• If ǫt = Θ
(
N
2
3K
1
3 t−
1
3 log
1
3 (NKt)
)
for all t, E[RT ] = O
(
N
2
3K
1
3 T
2
3 log
1
3 (NKT )
)
.
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• If ǫt = Θ
(
N
1
3K
2
3 t−
1
3 log
2
3 (NKt)
)
for all t, E[RT ] = O
(
N
1
3K
2
3 T
2
3 log
2
3 (NKT )
)
.
Proof. Fix t ∈ [T ]. Let bt denote the number of times Epsilon-Greedy performs exploration up to round t.
Note that E[bt] =
∑t
s=1 ǫ
s ≥ tǫt, where the last step follows from the fact that ǫt is monotonically decreasing
in both cases of the theorem. Let θ > 0 be a constant such that ǫt ≥ θ · t−1/3 in both cases of the theorem.
Define the event Bt , bt ≥ γ · tǫt, where γ = 1− 1/θ. Then, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
Pr[¬Bt] ≤ e−2(1−γ)2θ2t1/3 = e−2t1/3 ≤ e− log t = 1
t
. (2)
Because the algorithm performs round-robin during exploration, conditioned on Bt, we have that ntj ≥
bt
K ≥ γ·tǫ
t
K for each arm j,
3 which implies rtj ≤
√
K log(NKt)
γ·tǫt for each j. Thus, conditioned on Bt, we have
∀p ∈ ∆K :
∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj ≤ max
j∈[K]
rtj ≤
√
K log(NKt)
γ · tǫt . (3)
We are now ready to use the bounds from Lemmas 5 and 6. We focus on the event
Ctα , ∀p ∈ ∆K :
∣∣NSW(p, µ∗)−NSW(p, µ̂t)∣∣ ≤ αt · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj +
4
t
.
Conditioned on Et ∧ Ht, note that Ctα holds for αt = N due to Lemma 5, and for αt =
√
4NK log(NKt)
due to Lemma 6.
Let p̂t ∈ argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂t). We wish to bound the regret NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p̂t, µ∗) that Epsilon-
Greedy incurs when performing exploitation in round t by choosing policy p̂t. Conditioned on Et ∧Ht ∧ Bt,
we have
NSW(p∗, µ∗) −NSW(p̂t, µ∗)
=
(
NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p∗, µ̂t)
)
+
(
NSW(p∗, µ̂t)−NSW(p̂t, µ̂t)
)
+
(
NSW(p̂t, µ̂t)− NSW(p̂t, µ∗)
)
≤
∑
p∈
{
p∗,p̂t
} ∣∣NSW(p, µ∗)−NSW(p, µ̂t)∣∣ ≤ 2αt
√
K log(NKt)
γ · tǫt
+
8
t
, (4)
where the penultimate transition holds because p̂t is the optimal policy under µ̂t, so NSW(p∗, µ̂t) ≤
NSW(p̂t, µ̂t), and the final transition follows from Equation (3) and the fact that Et ∧Ht imply Ctα.
We are now ready to analyze the expected regret of Epsilon-Greedy at round T . We have
E[RT ] =
T∑
t=1
E[rt] ≤
T∑
t=1
E
[
ǫt · 1 + (1 − ǫt) · (NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p̂t, µ∗))]
≤
T∑
t=1
(
ǫt + Pr
[Et ∧Ht ∧ Ctα] · E [NSW(p∗, µ∗)− NSW(p̂t, µ∗) ∣∣∣ Et ∧Ht ∧ Ctα]
+ Pr
[¬Et ∨ ¬Ht ∨ ¬Ctα] · 1
)
≤
T∑
t=1
(
ǫt + 2αt
√
K log(NKt)
γ · tǫt +
8
t
+
5
t
)
,
where the final transition holds due to Equation (4), Lemma 4, Lemma 6, and Equation (2).
3Technically, nt
j
≥ ⌊ b
t
K
⌋ for each arm j, but we omit the floor for the ease of presentation.
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To obtain the first regret bound, we set ǫt = Θ
(
N
2
3K
1
3 t−
1
3 log
1
3 (NKt)
)
and αt = N , and obtain
E[RT ] = O
(
N
2
3 K
1
3 log
1
3 (NKT )
T∑
t=1
t−
1
3 +
T∑
t=1
1
t
)
= O
(
N
2
3K
1
3T
2
3 log
1
3 (NKT )
)
.
To obtain the second regret bound, we set ǫt = Θ
(
N
1
3K
2
3 t−
1
3 log
2
3 (NKt)
)
and αt =
√
4NK log(NKt),
and obtain
E[RT ] = O
(
N
2
3 K
1
3 log
2
3 (NKT )
T∑
t=1
t−1/3 +
T∑
t=1
1
t
)
= O
(
N
2
3K
1
3T
2
3 log
2
3 (NKT )
)
.
In both cases, we use Lemma 7 at the end.
5 UCB
Algorithm 3: UCB
Input: Number of agents N , number of arms K
Parameters :Confidence parameter αt for each t ∈ N
// Pull each arm once
for t = 1, . . . ,K do
pt ← policy that puts probability 1 on arm t // Pull arm t deterministically
end
for t = K + 1, . . . do
Compute the estimated reward matrix µ̂t
pt ← argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂t) + αt
∑
j∈[K] pj · rtj , where rtj ,
√
log(NKt)
nt
j
.
end
In the classical multi-armed bandit setting, UCB first pulls each arm once. Afterwards, it merges ex-
ploration and exploitation cleverly by pulling, in each round, an arm maximizing the sum of its estimated
reward and a confidence interval term similar to rtj in Algorithm 3. Our multi-agent variant similarly selects
a policy that maximizes the estimated Nash social welfare plus a confidence term for a policy, which simply
takes a linear combination of the confidence intervals of the arms. We show that this achieves the desired√
T dependence on the horizon. As this dependence is optimal even for the single-agent setting [1], one
cannot hope to improve it beyond logarithmic factors.
Theorem 3. UCB is horizon-independent, and has the following expected regret at any round T .
• If αt = N for all t, E[RT ] = O
(
NKT
1
2 log(NKT )
)
.
• If αt =
√
4NK log(NKt) for all t, E[RT ] = O
(
N
1
2K
3
2T
1
2 log
3
2 (NKT )
)
.
Proof. Let us again focus on the event
Ctα , ∀p ∈ ∆K :
∣∣NSW(p, µ∗)−NSW(p, µ̂t)∣∣ ≤ αt · ∑
j∈[K]
pj · rtj +
4
t
.
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As argued in the proof of Theorem 2, note that conditioned on Et∧Ht, Ctα holds for αt = N due to Lemma 5,
and for αt =
√
4NK log(NKt) due to Lemma 6. Next, conditioned on Ctα, we have that
NSW(p∗, µ∗) ≤ NSW(p∗, µ̂t) + αt
∑
j∈[K]
p∗j · rtj +
4
t
≤ NSW(pt, µ̂t) + αt
∑
j∈[K]
ptj · rtj +
4
t
≤ NSW(pt, µ∗) + 2αt
∑
j∈[K]
ptj · rtj +
8
t
,
where the first and the last transition are from conditioning on Ctα, and the second transition is because
p = pt maximizes the quantity NSW(p, µ̂t) + αt
∑
j∈[K] pj · rtj in the UCB algorithm.
Let us write p[T ] = (p1, . . . , pT ) for the random variable denoting the policies used by the algorithm, and
p[T ] = (p1, . . . , pT ) to denote a specific value in (∆K)T taken by the random variable. Next, we show that
regardless of the value of p[T ], we have bounded regret. Note that even after conditioning on the policies,
there is still randomness left in sampling actions from the policies and sampling the rewards of those actions.
Specifically, for c = N and c =
√
4NK log(NKT ), we show that E
[
RT | p[T ] = p[T ]] = O (cK√T log(NKT ))
holds for every p[T ], which also implies E[RT ] = O
(
cK
√
T log(NKT )
)
. Substituting the two values of c
then yields the two desired regret bounds, finishing the proof.
Fix p[T ] and let us condition on p[T ] = p[T ]. For t ∈ [T ] and j ∈ [K], define qtj =
∑t
s=1 p
s
j . Then,
E[ntj |p[T ] = p[T ]] = qtj . For each j ∈ [K], let Tj be the smallest t for which qtj ≥ 2
√
T log(NKT ) (if no such t
exists, let Tj = T ); note that Tj is fixed and not a random variable. Also, we have q
Tj
j = Θ
(√
T log(NKT )
)
for each j ∈ [K].
Let us define a clean event B , ∀j ∈ [K], nTjj ≥
√
T log(NKT ). We first show that this is a high
probability event. Indeed, using Hoeffding’s inequality, we have that for each j ∈ [K],
Pr[n
Tj
j <
√
T log(NKT )|p[T ] = p[T ]] ≤ Pr[nTjj < sTjj −
√
T log(NKT )|p[T ] = p[T ]] ≤ 1
N2K2T 2
.
Taking union bound over j ∈ [K], we have that Pr[B] ≥ 1 − 1N2KT 2 . Next, we bound expected regret at
round T using event B. Indeed,
E
[
RT
∣∣∣ p[T ] = p[T ]]
=
T∑
t=1
E
[
NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(pt, µ∗)
∣∣∣ p[T ] = p[T ]]
≤ K +
T∑
t=K+1
(
Pr
[
Et ∧Ht ∧ B] · E[NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(pt, µ∗)
∣∣ p[T ] = p[T ] ∧ Et ∧Ht ∧ B]
+ Pr[¬ET ∨ ¬Ht ∨ ¬B] · 1
)
≤ K +
T∑
t=K+1
E
2αt ∑
j∈[K]
ptj · rtj +
8
t
∣∣∣ Et ∧Ht ∧ B
+ T∑
t=K+1
Pr[¬ET ∨ ¬Ht ∨ ¬B]
≤ K + 2c
√
log(NKT )
T∑
t=K+1
∑
j∈[K]
ptj√
ctj
+
T∑
t=K+1
16
t
.
The penultimate transition holds for αt = N and αt =
√
4NK log(NKt) ≤
√
4NK log(NKT ), as argued in
the definition of Ctα. In the final transition, we observe that both values of αt are at most the corresponding
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values of c, and that conditioned on B, ntj is lower bounded by cj , where cj = 1 if t < Tj, and cj =√
T log(NKT ) if t ≥ Tj . Hence,
E
[
RT
∣∣∣∣∣ p[T ] = p[T ]
]
≤ K + 2c
√
log(NKT )
∑
j∈[K]
T∑
t=K+1
ptj√
cj
+O (logT )
= K + 2c
√
log(NKT )
∑
j∈[K]
 Tj−1∑
t=K+1
ptj
1
+
T∑
t=Tj
ptj√
T log(NKT )
+O (logT )
≤ K + 2c
√
log(NKT )
∑
j∈[K]
(
q
Tj
j +
T√
T log(NKT )
)
+O (logT )
= O
(
cK
√
T log(NKT )
)
,
as desired.
6 Discussion
Our work leaves several open questions and directions for future work.
Computation. We did not formally analyze the computational complexity of our algorithms. It is
easy to check that both Explore-First and Epsilon-Greedy can be implemented efficiently; the only non-
trivial step in these algorithms is computing the optimal policy given an estimated reward matrix, i.e.,
argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂). Since the Nash social welfare is known to be log-concave [29], this can be solved
efficiently. However, for UCB, the non-trivial step is argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂) + α
t
∑
j∈[K] pjr
t
j . Due to the
added linear term, the objective is no longer log-concave. Hence, it is not clear if this problem can be solved
efficiently. This remains a challenging open problem. However, this can also be viewed as optimizing a
polynomial over a simplex, which, while NP-hard in general, is known to admit a PTAS when the degree
is a constant [32, 33]. Hence, in our case, when the number of agents N is a constant, the problem can be
solved approximately, but it remains to be seen how this approximation translates to the regret bounds.
Logarithmic regret bound for UCB. In the classical stochastic multi-armed bandit setting, UCB has
two known regret bounds with optimal dependence on T . There is an instance-independent bound that grows
roughly as
√
T (where the constants depend only on K, and not on the mean rewards) and an instance-
dependent bound that grows roughly as logT (where the constants may depend on the mean rewards in
addition to K). While we recover the former bound in our multi-agent version, we were not able to derive
an instance-dependent logarithmic regret bound. This remains another challenging open problem.
Fairness. While maximizing the Nash social welfare is often seen as a fairness guarantee of its own, as
discussed in the introduction, the policy with the highest Nash social welfare is also known to satisfy other
fairness guarantees. However, it is not clear if the additive regret bounds we derive in terms of the Nash
social welfare also translate to bounds on the amount by which these other fairness guarantees are violated.
Considering other fairness guarantees and bounding their total violation is also an interesting direction for
the future.
Multi-agent extensions. More broadly, our work opens up the possibility of designing multi-agent exten-
sions of other multi-armed bandit problems. For example, one can consider a multi-agent dueling bandit
problem, in which an algorithm asks an agent (or all agents) to compare two arms rather than report their
reward for a single arm. Meaningfully defining the regret for such frameworks and designing algorithms that
bound it is an exciting future direction.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Note that the instantaneous regret rt(pt) in any round t can be at most 1 because NSW(p, µ∗) ∈ [0, 1]
for every policy p. Thus,
E[RT ] =
T∑
t=1
E[rt] ≤ KL · 1 + (T −KL) · E[NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p̂, µ∗)]. (5)
Thus, our goal is to bound E[NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p̂, µ∗)]. We bound this in two ways.
In the first approach, we bound how much µ̂ can deviate from µ∗. Specifically, we let ǫ =
√
log(NKT )
L
and define the event E , ∀i ∈ [N ], ∀j ∈ [K] :
∣∣µ̂i,j − µ∗i,j∣∣ ≤ ǫ. Since L is fixed, we have E[µ̂i,j ] = µ∗i,j . Hence,
we can directly apply Hoeffding’s inequality followed by the union bound to derive Pr[E ] ≥ 1− 2/T 2. Then,
using Lemma 3, we have that NSW(p, µ∗)−NSW(p, µ̂) ≤ Nǫ for every policy p. Now, we have
NSW(p∗, µ∗) ≤ NSW(p∗, µ̂) +Nǫ ≤ NSW(p̂, µ̂) +Nǫ ≤ NSW(p̂, µ∗) + 2Nǫ,
where the second transition is because p̂ ∈ argmaxp∈∆K NSW(p, µ̂). Substituting this into Equation (5) and
setting L = Θ
(
N
2
3K−
2
3 T
2
3 log
1
3 (NKT )
)
yields the first regret bound.
In the second approach, we notice that for a given p, E[NSW(p, µ̂)] = NSW(p, µ∗) because all µ̂i,j -s are
independent, and expectation decomposes over sums and products of independent variables. Thus, we can
use McDiarmid’s inequality to bound |NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| at a given p. Fix a δ-cover P of (∆K , ‖·‖1).
Fix p ∈ P . We first notice that µ̂i,j = (1/L) ·
∑L
s=1X
s
i,j , where X
s
i,j is the reward to agent i from the
s-th pull of arm j during the exploration phase.
We thus decompose µ̂ into N ·L random variables: for each i ∈ [N ] and s ∈ [L], we let Xsi = (Xsi,j)j∈[K].
To apply McDiarmid’s inequality, we need to analyze the maximum amount csi by which changing X
s
i can
change NSW(p, µ̂). Using Lemma 3, it is easy to see that csi ≤ 1/L for each i ∈ [N ] and s ∈ [L]. Now,
applying McDiarmid’s inequality, we have
Pr [|NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| ≤ ǫ] ≤ 2e
−2ǫ2∑
i∈[N ],s∈[L]
(cs
i
)2
= 2e
−2Lǫ2
N .
Setting ǫ =
√
N log(|P|T )
2L , we have that for each p ∈ P ,
Pr
[
|NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| ≤
√
N log(|P|T )
2L
]
≤ 2|P|T .
Using the union bound, we have that
Pr
[
∀p ∈ P : |NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| ≤
√
N log(|P|T )
2L
]
≥ 1− 2
T
.
For p ∈ ∆K , let p ∈ argminp′∈P ‖p− p′‖1. Then, since P is a δ-cover, we have ‖p− p‖1 ≤ δ. Thus, due
to Lemma 2, we have
|NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| ≤
∑
µ∈{µ̂,µ∗}
|NSW(p, µ)−NSW(p, µ)|+ |NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)|
≤ 2Nδ + |NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| .
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Setting δ = 1NT , we have
Pr
[
∀p ∈ ∆K : |NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| ≤ 2
T
+
√
N log(|P|T )
2L
]
≥ 1− 2
T
.
Next, we use the fact that
NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p̂, µ∗) ≤
∑
p∈{p∗,p̂}
|NSW(p, µ̂)−NSW(p, µ∗)| .
Hence,
Pr
[
|NSW(p∗, µ∗)−NSW(p̂, µ∗)| ≤ 4
T
+
√
2N log(|P|T )
L
]
≥ 1− 2
T
.
Next, we substitute |P| ≤ (1 + 2/δ)K ≤ (3/δ)K , δ = 1NT , and L = Θ
(
N
1
3K−
1
3 T
2
3 log
2
3 (NKT )
)
, and
then substitute the derived bound in Equation (5) to get the second regret bound.
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